Environmental Policymaking with Political Learning

Benjamin Blumenthal

No trn8u, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Effectively tackling environmental problems requires the implementation of appropriate policies by politicians. I propose a model of electoral accountability in which voters learn about politicians' policy preferences and environmental policies' appropriateness by observing past policy choices and outcomes. Compared to a benevolent policymaker benchmark, I show that reputational concerns can lead to suboptimal policymaking, as a result of the interdependence between voters' learning about implemented policies and their induced preferences over politicians: when favourable policy outcomes lead voters to prefer policy persistence, the desire to appear responsive can stifle the implementation of the right environmental policy.

Date: 2024-09-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://osf.io/download/66d96d572410f3356e77b065/

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:trn8u

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/trn8u

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SocArXiv from Center for Open Science
Bibliographic data for series maintained by OSF ().