Strategic Bargaining in Search Models

Arun Jayasena, Mumi Libir and Omar Rahmat

No u9b4c_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: This paper provides a survey on strategic bargaining in decentralized markets with search frictions. We review how alternating-offers bargaining, renegotiation risks, and participation constraints shape outcomes in both random and directed search environments. We discuss implications for labor, product, and credit markets, with particular attention to cases where posted terms do not fully determine final outcomes.

Date: 2025-05-27
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:u9b4c_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/u9b4c_v1

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