Electoral Competition, Turnout, and Ranked Choice Voting

Peter Buisseret and Carlo Prato

No ukras_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: We compare multi-candidate elections under plurality rule versus ranked choice voting (RCV). In our framework candidates choose whether to pursue a narrow campaign that targets their base, or instead pursue a broad campaign that can appeal to the entire electorate. We present two main results comparing RCV to plurality. First, RCV can intensify candidates’ incentives to target their core supporters at the expense of a broader appeal. Second, RCV may increase the probability that a candidate who would lose any pairwise contest nonetheless wins a multi-candidate contest. Our results challenge widely held contentions about the benefits of adopting RCV.

Date: 2023-03-31
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://osf.io/download/641c7664a69c1b00408c18b5/

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:ukras_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/ukras_v1

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SocArXiv from Center for Open Science
Bibliographic data for series maintained by OSF ().