Not Just the Rules: Favorable Outcomes Reduce Subjective Experiences of Administrative Burden

Frederik Godt Hansen and Aske Halling
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Frederik Godt Hansen: Aarhus University
Aske Halling: Aarhus University

No uxcb7_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: A large body of research shows that compliance demands—administrative hassles and rules—impose learning, compliance, and psychological costs on individuals. Because costs are conceptualized as subjective, most studies rely on self reported measures. This article examines that approach by asking: To what extent do factors beyond compliance demands shape the subjective experience of administrative burdens? We argue that one factor, distinct from compliance demands, is the favorability of outcomes allocated by public organizations. We integrate outcome favorability into the administrative burden framework, proposing that 1) favorable outcomes reduce administrative burdens, as subjectively experienced and 2) favorable outcomes moderate the effect of compliance demands on the experience of administrative burdens. We test these expectations in two studies: an analysis of real-world interactions from the German Life Events Survey (n≈4,000) and a Danish survey experiment with randomized demands and outcomes (n=1,624). Both studies show that favorable outcomes reduce administrative burdens, as subjectively experienced, raising questions about how much self reported learning, compliance, and psychological costs reflect reactions to administrative requirements rather than other aspects of citizen-state interactions.

Date: 2026-05-22
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:uxcb7_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/uxcb7_v1

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