Asset Manager Capitalism as a Corporate Governance Regime

Benjamin Braun

No v6gue_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Who holds power in corporate America? Scholars have invariably answered this question in the language of ownership and control. This paper argues that tackling this question today requires a new language. Whereas the comparative political economy literature has long treated dispersed ownership and weak shareholders as core features of the U.S. political economy, a century-long process of re-concentration has consolidated shareholdings in the hands of a few very large asset management companies. In an historically unprecedented configuration, this emerging asset manager capitalism is dominated by fully diversified shareholders that lack direct economic interest in the performance of individual portfolio companies. The paper compares this new corporate governance regime to its predecessors; reconstructs the history of the growth and consolidation of the asset management sector; and examines the political economy of asset manager capitalism, both at the firm level and at the macroeconomic level.

Date: 2020-06-18
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:v6gue_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/v6gue_v1

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