From Structural Pressure to Coordination Dynamics: Game Theory and the Prediction of Regime Transitions

Alen Kaminski

No wxbvq_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: This paper extends the K-coefficient model of systemic crisis, introduced in Anatomy of Chaos: A Theoretical Framework for Forecasting the Morphology of Post-Crisis Regime, by integrating a game-theoretic layer that addresses a question the baseline model cannot answer: why do systems under comparable structural pressure follow divergent transitional paths? The K-coefficient, defined as the ratio of the Structural Stress Index (SSI) to the Structural Resilience Index (SRI), identifies the zone of critical pressure with empirically demonstrated consistency. However, it does not explain why systems with similar K values produce outcomes ranging from rapid regime change to protracted civil war to regime survival without significant concessions. The paper proposes that this divergence is explained by coordination dynamics, formalized through the framework of global games (Morris and Shin, 1998, 2003). Five coordination variables are introduced: R (expected cost of uncoordinated action), C (network connectivity), EFI (Equilibrium Fragility Index = K × C/R), T (coordination threshold), and K_eff (effective K-coefficient = K × (1 + C/R)). The model defines two Nash equilibria — NE1 (inaction) and NE2 (action) — and specifies the conditions under which a stochastic trigger, functioning as a public signal, initiates the transition between them. The formal apparatus is applied to three case studies. The USSR and the Eastern Bloc (1989–1991) demonstrate cascading R decline: each successive regime collapse reduced the expected cost of action in neighboring systems. The Arab Spring (2010–2011) demonstrates heterogeneity of outcomes under a single cascading signal: six systems with K values in the range of 2.10 to 2.86 produced six distinct outcomes, with variation corresponding to differences in EFI. Ukraine (2013–2014) demonstrates non-cascading transition and the repression paradox: the regime escalated coercive force, but in a high-C environment each act of repression functioned as a public signal that reduced R rather than raising it. An extended sample of twenty-two additional cases confirms three empirical patterns: high K combined with high EFI produces rapid transition; high K combined with low EFI produces protracted conflict or regime survival; and moderate K produces indeterminate outcomes regardless of EFI. The paper acknowledges significant limitations: retrospective assignment of variable values, absence of inter-coder reliability, and the absence of a blind predictive test. Five directions for future research are identified, with the blind predictive test designated as the first priority.

Date: 2026-04-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:wxbvq_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/wxbvq_v1

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