The Good Council: Deliberating Inequality in a Field Experiment

Franziska Disslbacher, Martin Haselmayer, Severin Rapp, Lukas Lehner and Franziska Windisch
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Franziska Disslbacher: Vienna University of Economics and Business

No zcuw6_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: This paper investigates how participation in a citizens’ assembly affects individuals’ redistributive preferences and (perceived) role in democracy. We implement a pre-registered field experiment embedded in a real-world citizens’ assembly on wealth inequality in Austria. Using a three-group-design comparing assembly participants, non-selected volunteers, and a population sample, we isolate the causal effects of taking part in a citizens’ assembly from self-selection into participation. We find that while participating in the citizens’ assembly substantially improves factual knowledge about the wealth distribution and promotes convergence around specific tax policy proposals, notably a EUR 1 million allowance, it has no measurable effect on political efficacy or broader civic engagement. We also document significant political self-selection: individuals willing to participate in the citizens’ assembly were already more engaged and supportive of redistribution than the general population. These findings suggest that while deliberative formats can foster informed convergence on policy proposals, their ability to mobilize broader publics is limited – especially if they primarily engage the already supportive and, as in this case, lack institutional anchoring that might facilitate spillover into more institutionalized political arenas. (Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality Working Paper)

Date: 2025-10-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:zcuw6_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/zcuw6_v1

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