Kantian Equilibrium, Income Inequality, and Global Public Goods

Yukihiro Nishimura ()
Additional contact information
Yukihiro Nishimura: Osaka University and CESifo

No 25-04, Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics

Abstract: This paper develops a Kantian equilibrium framework, subsuming the global pollution model with private ownership, wherein agents condition their contributions on a universalizable moral imperative reflecting income and preference heterogeneity. After showing a specific proportionality assumption linking Kantian reasoning to other agents’ behavior that must make the Kantian equilibrium coincide with the Lindahl equilibrium, we show that the level of the public good increases with income inequality. Applying this framework to a global pollution model, we demonstrate that the Lindahl allocation in the global pollution model may fail to Pareto dominate the voluntary contribution (disagreement) equilibrium. In the global public good problem, we compare the Lindahl allocation with other proposed solutions, so we will discuss the nature of inter-country transfers and whether it Pareto dominates the disagreement equilibrium. Our analysis contributes to a re-interpretation of the morally grounded mechanisms for global public good provision, offering a bridge between normative ethics and economic design.

Keywords: Global externalities; Kantian equilibrium; Income inequality; International emissions trading (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2025-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-env
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osk:wpaper:2504

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers in Economics and Business from Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The Economic Society of Osaka University ().