Strategy-proof allocation problem with hard budget constraints and income effects: weak efficiency and fairness

Yuya Wakabayashi, Ryosuke Sakai and Hiroki Shinozaki
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Yuya Wakabayashi: JSPS Research Fellow (DC2), Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
Ryosuke Sakai: School of Engineering, Tokyo Institute of Technology
Hiroki Shinozaki: Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubahi University

No 24E003, OSIPP Discussion Paper from Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University

Abstract: We consider the single-object allocation problem with monetary transfers. Agents have hard budgets and their utility functions may exhibit income effects. We characterize truncated Vickrey rules with endogenous reserve prices by constrained efficiency or weak envy-freeness for equals, in addition to individual rationality, no subsidy for losers, and strategy-proofness. The same characterization result hold even if we replace weak envy freeness for equals with other fairness conditions; equal treatment of equals, envy-freeness, and anonymity in welfare.

Keywords: Single-object allocation problem; Non-quasi-linear preference; Hard budget constraint; Efficiency; Fairness; Strategy-proofness; Vickrey rule with reserve prices (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D47 D63 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27pages
Date: 2024-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-upt
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