Complete Loss of Competition:Uncontested Elections and Political Rents
Naruki Notsu,
Asahi Semma and
Shuko Harada
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Naruki Notsu: Osaka School of International Public Policy, The University of Osaka
Asahi Semma: Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting Co., Ltd.
Shuko Harada: Osaka School of International Public Policy, The University of Osaka
No 25E004, OSIPP Discussion Paper from Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
Abstract:
This study examines how the complete absence of electoral competition shapes politicians’ behavior. To explore this, we focus on mayoral elections in Japanese municipalities, a setting where uncontested elections are a common and politically important phenomenon. Using the variation in uncontested elections across municipalities at each election year, we examine subsequent changes in mayors’ salaries. We find that mayors who win office without a contest subsequently increase their salaries. The pattern also extends to pivotal stakeholders. These findings suggest that when public conflicts, such as the existence of other candidates, do not exist, politicians are more likely to seek personal gain, highlighting the fundamental role of elections in disciplining officeholders.
Keywords: Uncontested elections; Politicians’ behavior; Political rent; No competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37pages
Date: 2025-09
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osp:wpaper:25e004
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