Risk Sharing in a Dual Labor Market

Jonathan Créchet

No 2307E, Working Papers from University of Ottawa, Department of Economics

Abstract: In OECD countries, the labor market features a coexistence of open-ended, permanent jobs subject to strict employment protection and fixed-term, temporary contracts. This paper introduces a search-and-matching model of a dual labor market - divided between permanent and temporary jobs - with risk aversion and dynamic employment contracts. Optimal contracting entails a trade-off between commitment and the flexibility of separation, a novel rationale for the coexistence of permanent and temporary jobs. The paper shows that this coexistence emerges when (i) firms find it optimal to provide insurance to workers, (ii) the firms' commitment ability is limited, and (iii) the match-quality distribution has enough dispersion. In this setup, firing costs are potentially associated with welfare gains for both employed and unemployed workers.

Keywords: Search frictions; Dynamic contracts; Limited commitment; Employment protection legislation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 J41 J58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 72 pages
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-lab
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ott:wpaper:2307e

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