Innovation, Strategic Environmental Policy and North-South Trade: A Game Theoretic Analysis

K. Eslamloueyan

Working Papers from University of Ottawa, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper provides a framework to study how lobby-government interactions affect environmental R&D programs, government' green policies, firms' profitability, and environmental quality when a Northern country and a Southern country are engaged in trade. In our model, the motivation for an incumbent government to use environmental policy arises from its selfish desire to maximize its political support.

Keywords: INNOVATIONS; ENVIRONMENT; GAME THEORY; TRADE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F13 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ott:wpaper:9802e

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