Evolutionary game analysis of energy saving behavior of tourism enterprises under carbon emission constraints

Zi Tang and Minsi Zhang

International Journal of Low-Carbon Technologies, 2023, vol. 18, 49-54

Abstract: As one of the sectors affected by global climate change, tourism enterprises are actively seeking feasible energy-saving and emission reduction schemes. The article adopts the evolutionary game approach and establishes the game matrix between tourism enterprises and the government. The research results show that the strategy choice of the two-game subjects depends on the initial state and its evolutionary path. The local government needs to adjust penalty measures for environmental pollution of tourism enterprises and reduce the cost of controlling low carbon reasonably tourism. Enterprises need to reduce the cost of saving energy through dynamic adjustment of carbon emission rewards, which are the basis of the long-term perspective and the big picture. On the premise of considering both interests, tourism enterprises and government should make joint efforts to achieve the goal of energy conservation, environmental protection and sustainable development.

Keywords: evolutionary game; tourism enterprises; energy saving behavior; carbon emission constraints (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ijlctc:v:18:y:2023:i::p:49-54.

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