Research on evolution game of low-carbon strategy of government, intelligent manufacturing enterprises, and consumers

Bangtong Huang, Qi Xu, Linguo Chen, Tianchen Yang, Ruoyu Chang and Yanjie Han

International Journal of Low-Carbon Technologies, 2025, vol. 20, 1283-1291

Abstract: With the aim of reducing businesses’ carbon emissions and encouraging low-carbon product purchasing behavior, an evolutionary game model involving government, intelligent manufacturing enterprises, and consumers is constructed, analyzes stability strategy, verifies the conclusion with numerical simulation, and analyzes the factors affecting the system’s evolution. The study indicates that the government’s acquisition of social welfare benefits and carbon tax revenue should exceed the costs associated with government supervision and subsidies provided to enterprises and consumers, ensuring the system’s single stable strategy. Carbon pricing mechanisms and low-carbon subsidies provided to enterprises and consumers influence the system’s evolution.

Keywords: third-party subject; evolutionary game; carbon trading; carbon subsidies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ijlctc:v:20:y:2025:i::p:1283-1291.

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