A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF U.K. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

Cento Veljanovski

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2014, vol. 10, issue 3, 711-738

Abstract: The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has been a highly rated competition law enforcer. Yet its antitrust performance activities fall far short of this image. Here a critical assessment is made of the OFT’s antitrust enforcement activities, and of the claim that there is quantitative survey evidence that the OFT has had a “significant deterrent effect.” It concludes that the evidence for this claim is flawed and not credible.

JEL-codes: D4 K0 K14 K21 L1 L11 L12 L13 L4 L41 L44 N60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:10:y:2014:i:3:p:711-738.

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Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti

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