THE DETERRENT AND ENUNCIATING EFFECTS OF CONSENT DECREES

Giovanna Massarotto

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2015, vol. 11, issue 2, 493-499

Abstract: More than 90 percent of U.S. civil antitrust cases settle by consent decrees. This phenomenon raises two questions. First, do consent decrees sacrifice antitrust deterrence, given that no finding of liability is made and no fine imposed? Second, do consent decrees sacrifice the public good of adjudication to say what the law is? A comparison of the Intel investigations in Europe and the United States shows that consent decrees need not sacrifice deterrence. However, the current European approach to consent decrees, unlike the U.S. approach, does sacrifice the benefit of having courts explain the content of competition law.

JEL-codes: D4 D42 K21 L11 L12 L41 L86 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:11:y:2015:i:2:p:493-499.

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Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti

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