AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TOWARDS FINE VALUE OPTIMIZATION FOR ANTIMONOPOLY VIOLATIONS

Sergey Petrov and Aleksandr Shmakov

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2015, vol. 11, issue 3, 775-790

Abstract: The article proposes an approach to the identification of optimal fine value for the Antitrust Law violation based on the analysis of incentives of economic entities to violate the law. This approach was tested with the example of the oil industry and coal industry entities of the Russian economy.

JEL-codes: D02 D24 D43 K21 K23 L13 L40 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:11:y:2015:i:3:p:775-790.

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