 ANTITRUST AND DEMOCRACY: PERSPECTIVES FROM EFFICIENCY AND EQUITYTay-Cheng Ma Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2016, vol. 12, issue 2, 233-261 Abstract: This article estimates a simultaneous equations model to explore the linkages between antitrust and democracy in a cross-country dataset for 109 countries from 1996 to 2011. The model is specified to decompose the total effect of antitrust on democracy into two channels: one through efficiency and the other through equity. The model's purpose is to identify whether and how antitrust affects democracy through these two variables. The model's results suggest that equity (improving income distribution) rather than efficiency (promoting economic development) serves as the main channel through which antitrust influences democracy. However, even if improving income distribution by protecting consumers and small businesses is the channel through which antitrust safeguards political democracy, its effect is very small. Therefore, the goal of improving income distribution to promote democracy should fall into the realm of taxation and transfer payments rather than antitrust. JEL-codes: L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:12:y:2016:i:2:p:233-261. Access Statistics for this article Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti More articles in Journal of Competition Law and Economics from Oxford University Press |
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