WHO CONFESSES FOR LENIENCY? EVIDENCE FROM KOREA

Nayoung Kim and Yungsan Kim

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2016, vol. 12, issue 2, 351-374

Abstract: This article addresses which cartel members are more likely to confess to the antitrust authority under a leniency program and how the first and the second confessors differ. This study utilizes unique data from the records of those who were granted leniency in the Korea Fair Trade Commission's cartel investigations from 2005 to 2009, in which the identities of leniency recipients were revealed. The results identify several company-level attributes that affected the tendency to confess, as well as the cartel-level attributes explored in previous studies. The results also suggest that there are qualitative differences between the first and the second confessors. We find that the members of large and powerful Korean conglomerates (“chaebol”) are more likely to confess first for leniency, while discouraging others to do the same.

JEL-codes: K21 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:12:y:2016:i:2:p:351-374.

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Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti

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