PRIVATE ANTITRUST AT THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

F Scott Kieff

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2018, vol. 14, issue 1, 46-64

Abstract: This paper, drafted as an adjudicator's opinion in a recent case of nearly first impression, explores private antitrust adjudication in the Section 337 docket of the US International Trade Commission (ITC). There are several significant reasons why even a skeptic of the ITC's Anti-dumping, Countervailing Duty, and Safeguards docket (collectively, the “Title VII” docket)—as well as an antitrust skeptic—should be significantly less worried when cases normally expected to be brought in the Title VII portion of the ITC's docket as petitions are instead brought in the Section 337 portion of the ITC docket as complaints alleging ordinary violations of the antitrust laws. Private antitrust litigation fits with the plain meaning of the ITC's statute and with well-established antitrust case law. The ITC 337 docket also offers some practical benefits over courts and other agencies. The procedures do not rely heavily administrative deference; and do rely heavily on the full panoply of procedural devices ordinarily available in court for truth-testing of evidence including cross examination, all in a timeframe likely to be significantly shorter (around 18 months) than the many years typically required for antitrust litigation in federal court, and without the black box of a general jury verdict. What about the doctrine that federal courts developed called “antitrust injury?” The ITC relied on that doctrine to dismiss a case recently brought by the domestic U.S. steel industry against Chinese importers of steel. This paper explores some reasons why that doctrine does not fit the ITC 337 statute.

Date: 2018
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Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti

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