Priority Setting as A Double-Edged Sword: How Modernization Strengthened the Role of Public Policy

Or Brook

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2020, vol. 16, issue 4, 435-487

Abstract: This article questions the common view that the modernization of EU competition law has removed public policy considerations from the public enforcement of Article 101 TFEU. Based on a large quantitative and qualitative database including all of the Commission’s and five national competition authorities’ enforcement actions (N ≈ 1,700), it maintains that modernization has merely shifted the consideration of public policy from the substantive scope of Article 101(3) TFEU to procedural priority setting decisions. Instead of engaging in a complex balancing of competition and public policy considerations, the competition authorities have simply refrained from pursuing cases against anticompetitive agreements that raise public policy questions or settled those cases by accepting negotiated remedies. This outcome, the article claims, is a double-edged sword. The Commission’s attempt to narrow down the scope of Article 101(3) as part of modernization has not eliminated the role of public policy in the enforcement. Rather, undertakings can reasonably assume that restrictions of competition that produce some public policy objectives will not be enforced, even if they do not meet the conditions for an exception. These discretionary nonenforcement decisions have a detrimental impact on the effectiveness, uniformity, and legal certainty of EU competition law enforcement.JEL: K21, K230

Date: 2020
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Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti

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