Horizontal Directors Revisited

Yaron Nili

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2022, vol. 18, issue 1, 5-28

Abstract: U.S. academic discourse on director interlocks is not new. Yet, the increased attention to common ownership has also brought to light the increased tendency of interlocked directors to serve in the same industry. I termed these directors as horizontal directors in my earlier work—shining a light on the benefits they bring to investors and companies but also the risks they pose to governance and antitrust law. This article revisits the prevalence of horizontal directors armed with six additional years of data and shows that the prevalence of horizontal directors has remained steady, even as attention to common ownership has increased in recent years. These findings should serve as a clarion call to regulators—urging them to directly address horizontal directors.

Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:18:y:2022:i:1:p:5-28.

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Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti

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