Collusion as Environmental Protection—An Economic Assessment

Cento Veljanovski

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2022, vol. 18, issue 3, 523-550

Abstract: This article examines the relationship between the environment, sustainability, and European competition law. It shows that the European Commission’s decisional practice not to exempt anticompetitive agreements under Article 101(3) TFEU is because it selectively prosecutes hardcore cartels. The alleged ‘sustainability gap’ in EU antitrust is, therefore, more apparent than real. It is also shown that the Commission has adopted an efficient enforcement approach given the institutional and budgetary constraints it faces. On the other hand, the Commission’s guidelines on Article 101 TFEU lack coherence and consistency with its overarching Treaty obligations. The pros and cons of expanding Article 101(3) TFEU to take account of the third-party environmental and public policy factors are examined.

Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:18:y:2022:i:3:p:523-550.

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Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti

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