THE CASE OF EXPORT CARTEL EXEMPTIONS: BETWEEN COMPETITION AND PROTECTIONISM

Florian Becker

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2007, vol. 3, issue 1, 97-126

Abstract: Most competition laws do not prohibit anticompetitive conduct that affects foreign target markets as long as there is no spill over effect on the home market. The U.S. in particular justifies this leniency towards export cartels by the aim of increasing efficiency in target markets that are suffering from high entrance barriers for importers. Attempts to use the legal regime of the WTO to overcome private restrictions of competition are likely to fail, because of the fundamental differences between trade policy and competition policy. Although a multilateral competition policy would be best suited to challenge export cartels, the current state of the political debate makes it more likely that second-best solutions such as capacity building in lesser developed target states will have to be established.

Date: 2007
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Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti

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