POSTED PRICING AS A PLUS FACTOR

Joseph E. Harrington

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2011, vol. 7, issue 1, 1-35

Abstract: This article identifies conditions under which an industry-wide practice of posted (or list) pricing is a plus factor sufficient to conclude that firms established an agreement to coordinate their prices. For certain classes of markets, it is shown that, under competition, all firms setting a list price with a policy of no discounting is contrary to competition. Thus, if all firms choose posted pricing, it is to facilitate collusion by making it easier for them to coordinate their prices. It is then argued that the adoption of posted pricing communicates the necessary intent and reliance to conclude concerted action.

JEL-codes: K21 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:7:y:2011:i:1:p:1-35.

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Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti

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