THE USE AND THREAT OF INJUNCTIONS IN THE RAND CONTEXT

James Ratliff and Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2013, vol. 9, issue 1, 1-22

Abstract: We model a dispute between the owner of a standard-essential patent and an implementer of the standard over whether the patentee's license offer is reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND). An injunction is not ruled out, yet that threat does not lead to holdup. A key element is that the implementer always has a last-resort ability to accept license terms that are either certified by a court as RAND or mutually agreed upon by the patentee and implementer.

JEL-codes: K41 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:9:y:2013:i:1:p:1-22.

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Journal of Competition Law and Economics is currently edited by Nicholas Economides, Amelia Fletcher, Michal Gal, Damien Geradin, Ioannis Lianos and Tommaso Valletti

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