 The automatic termination clause in the Fisheries Subsidies Agreement—brinkmanship for future negotiation or a time bomb for self-destruction?Jaemin Lee Journal of International Economic Law, 2024, vol. 27, issue 3, 480-499 Abstract: The Fisheries Subsidies Agreement (FSA) is an important stride forward, but its future is uncertain because of the embedded automatic termination clause. There is a substantial possibility that this provision comes into effect. It would be prudent to focus on how best to utilize the FSA before that scenario materializes. Most notably, international law jurisprudence and World Trade Organization precedents posit that panels can continue to review disputes and issue decisions even after the FSA is terminated as long as the disputes are brought to them before termination. The automatic termination clause is a unique, unprecedented feature, which may kill the hard-earned momentum of the fisheries subsidies regulation. If managed well, however, the potential damage can be controlled and the new agreement can be utilized for the ultimate success of global fisheries subsidies regulation. Date: 2024 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jieclw:v:27:y:2024:i:3:p:480-499. Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Journal of International Economic Law is currently edited by Kathleen Claussen, Sergio Puig and Michael Waibel More articles in Journal of International Economic Law from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. |
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