The concept of the level playing field in International Economic Law
Marios Tokas
Journal of International Economic Law, 2024, vol. 27, issue 3, 558-576
Abstract:
International economic relations are often compared to a sports game. Within this game, states and private companies compete for influence, market shares, and resources. Competition is unfair when the field has a slope. In keeping with this sports analogy, the ‘game’ of international economic relations depends on a level playing field (LPF). International economic exchange is fair only when this playing field lacks a slope. This article argues that the LPF in international economic law does not require fully equalizing the regulatory burden across market actors, even when incorporating sustainability considerations. Instead, whether regulatory divergences lead to an uneven playing field depends on the nature, intensity, and source of such divergences, and varies on a case-by-case basis. This is important because countries have increasingly introduced LPF measures that seek to achieve comparable regulatory burdens. LPF measures cover a wide range of matters, including environmental and labour standards, subsidies, competition law, and state-owned enterprises.
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jiel/jgae026 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jieclw:v:27:y:2024:i:3:p:558-576.
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of International Economic Law is currently edited by Kathleen Claussen, Sergio Puig and Michael Waibel
More articles in Journal of International Economic Law from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().