Entry, Competition, and Regulation in UK Telecommunications

Martin Cave and Peter Williamson

Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 1996, vol. 12, issue 4, 100-121

Abstract: In a formerly monopolized industry now subject to competition, there is likely to be considerable interaction between business strategy and regulation. The paper illustrates the development of this process in UK telecommunications. It sets out a framework in which competition between incumbent and entrants takes the form of a race on the part of the former to bridge the innovation gap and on the part of the latter to accumulate the necessary strategic assets, including regulatory assets. The strategies of major UK fixed-link telecommunications firms are analyzed in this light, and regulatory policy towards vertical separation in mobile telephony is also described. The article draws attention to the crucial role which the regulator plays in assisting entrants to gain access to strategic assets, including information. Copyright 1996 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:oxford:v:12:y:1996:i:4:p:100-121

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