Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations

Jacques Cremer

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1986, vol. 101, issue 1, 33-49

Abstract: This paper argues that overlapping games can provide a natural theory of long-lived organizations. It shows that participation in organizations of infinite duration changes the incentives of agents with finite lives, and will induce more cooperation than a static model would predict. After developing the general theory, we apply it to the description of career paths in organizations and show that it can be optimal to give the youngest workers the most arduous tasks.

Date: 1986
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (91)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/1884640 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:101:y:1986:i:1:p:33-49.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

The Quarterly Journal of Economics is currently edited by Robert J. Barro, Lawrence F. Katz, Nathan Nunn, Andrei Shleifer and Stefanie Stantcheva

More articles in The Quarterly Journal of Economics from President and Fellows of Harvard College
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().