Partisan Monetary Policies: Presidential Influence Through the Power of Appointment

Henry Chappell, Thomas M. Havrilesky and Rob Roy McGregor

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1993, vol. 108, issue 1, 185-218

Abstract: We investigate the channels through which partisan influence from a Presidential administration could affect monetary policy-making. Influence could be a result of direct Presidential pressure exerted on members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), or it could be a result of partisan considerations in Presidential appointments to the Board of Governors. To investigate these two channels of influence, we devise and apply a method for estimating parameters of monetary policy reaction functions that can vary across individual members of the FOMC. Our results suggest that the appointments process is the primary mechanism by which partisan differences in monetary policies arise.

Date: 1993
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (126)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2118500 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:108:y:1993:i:1:p:185-218.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

The Quarterly Journal of Economics is currently edited by Robert J. Barro, Lawrence F. Katz, Nathan Nunn, Andrei Shleifer and Stefanie Stantcheva

More articles in The Quarterly Journal of Economics from President and Fellows of Harvard College
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().