The Firm as a Communication Network

Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994, vol. 109, issue 4, 809-839

Abstract: This paper analyzes how organizations can minimize costs of processing and communicating information. Communication is costly because it takes time for an agent to absorb new information sent by others. Agents can reduce this time by specializing in the processing of particular types of information. When these returns to specialization outweigh costs of communication, it is efficient for several agents to collaborate within a firm. It is shown that efficient networks involve centralization, that individuals delegate tasks to subordinates only if they are overloaded, and that the number of transits to the top tends to be equalized across individual information items.

Date: 1994
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