Do Public Schools Hire the Best Applicants?

Dale Ballou

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1996, vol. 111, issue 1, 97-133

Abstract: Despite a surplus of candidates for most teaching jobs, a strong academic record does little for an applicants job prospects. This does not appear to result from lukewarm interest on the part of such applicants or choosiness about the positions they accept. Administrators' lack of interest in these candidates may reflect the weakness of competitive pressures in public education. Policies intended to improve teacher quality need to consider incentives on both the demand and supply sides of the market.

Date: 1996
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