Regionalism and Multilateralism: A Political Economy Approach

Pravin Krishna

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1998, vol. 113, issue 1, 227-251

Abstract: Preferential trading arrangements are analyzed from the viewpoint of the "new political economy" that views trade policy as being determined by lobbying of concentrated interest groups. Two conclusions are reached: first, that trade-diverting preferential arrangements are more likely to be supported politically; and second, that such preferential arrangements could critically change domestic incentives so multilateral liberalization that is initially politically feasible could be rendered infeasible by a preferential arrangement. The larger the trade diversion resulting from the preferential arrangement, the more likely this will be the case.

Date: 1998
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Working Paper: Regionalism and Multilateralism: A Political Economy Approach (1996)
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