Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives

Efraim Benmelech, Eugene Kandel and Pietro Veronesi

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2010, vol. 125, issue 4, 1769-1820

Abstract: The use of stock-based compensation as a solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers has increased dramatically since the early 1990s. We show that in a dynamic rational expectations model with asymmetric information, stock-based compensation not only induces managers to exert costly effort, but also induces them to conceal bad news about future growth options and to choose suboptimal investment policies to support the pretense. This leads to a severe overvaluation and a subsequent crash in the stock price. Our model produces many predictions that are consistent with the empirical evidence and are relevant to understanding the current crisis.

Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (109)

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Working Paper: Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives (2008)
Working Paper: Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives (2007)
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