Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy

Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1979, vol. 93, issue 4, 563-587

Abstract: I. The setter's problem under certainty and the importance of the reversion point, 565.—II. Budget-maximizing with uncertain turnout, 571.—III. Exploiting a sequence of elections, 579.—IV. Implications for empirical research, 581.—Appendix, 585.

Date: 1979
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