A Method for Determining the Appropriateness of National Planning in a Market Economy

Jeffrey Miller ()

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1980, vol. 95, issue 2, 261-276

Abstract: Meade demonstrates how, in the absence of futures markets for many commodities, indicative planning can supply economic agents with the requisite information about future market conditions. An incentive scheme designed to encourage agents to relay accurate information to central planners is introduced into Meade's model. It is then shown how the Groves and Loeb voting procedure can be used to determine whether an indicative planning program would be beneficial.

Date: 1980
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