Tournament Incentives and Acquisition Performance

Powerful CEOs and their impact on firm performance

Iftekhar Hasan, Marco Navone, Thomas To and Eliza Wu

The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 2020, vol. 9, issue 2, 384-419

Abstract: This paper examines the impact of promotion-based tournament incentives on corporate acquisition performance. Measuring tournament incentives as the compensation ratio between the CEO and other senior executives, we show that acquirers with greater tournament incentives experience lower announcement returns. Further analysis shows that the negative effect is driven by the risk-seeking behavior of senior executives induced by tournament incentives. Our results are robust to alternative identification strategies. Our evidence highlights that senior executives, in addition to the CEO, play an influential role in acquisition decisions. (JEL G30, G34, G41, J31, J33, J62)Received: November 5, 2018; editorial decision January 6, 2020 by Editor Isil Erel.

Date: 2020
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