Retaining Influence in Post-Brexit International Financial Regulation: Lessons from the UK’s FinTech Framework

Pedro Schilling de Carvalho

Journal of Financial Regulation, 2022, vol. 8, issue 1, 104-131

Abstract: A common rhetoric has emerged among UK authorities when it comes to how to deal with a potential loss of influence in the regulation of financial services after Brexit: as divergence from the EU increases, it will be necessary to retain the UK’s influence as a rule maker through an enhanced engagement via international standard-setting bodies (ISSBs). This article argues that placing an excessive focus on the role of ISSBs to mitigate the UK’s loss of influence might be misguided, based on an analysis of the UK’s past relationship with these regulatory networks, alongside an assessment of their historical shortcomings and increasing limitations. Furthermore, this article advances the argument that the UK FinTech regulatory approach might serve as a successful complementary template for influence, combining a domestic framework with the development of a domestic-led network. For that purpose, this article compares initial responses to FinTech regulation at the UK, EU, and international levels, focusing on the Financial Conduct Authority’s regulatory sandbox and Global Financial Innovation Network to show how the UK’s regulatory ethos was effectively exported, constraining the options available to other countries while also framing the debate at the international level.

Keywords: FinTech; regulatory sandbox; international standards; Brexit; GFIN; NGFS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:refreg:v:8:y:2022:i:1:p:104-131.

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