 Widerquist on Citizens’ Capital AccountsJason Berntsen Chapter Chapter 15 in Exporting the Alaska Model, 2012, pp 209-216 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract Opponents to Widerquist’s proposed system of Citizens’ Capital Accounts (CCAs) will fall naturally into two categories. Some will oppose it simply on the grounds that it would be a large government program designed to redistribute resources from the rich to the poor. This category of opponent divides naturally into two subcategories: those who regard government redistribution programs backed by coercive taxation as morally objectionable in principle, and those who think that even if such government programs are in principle justifiable, they tend not to work, and tend, in fact, to have seriously bad unintended consequences. In contrast, opponents in the second category are sympathetic to governmental attempts at redistribution but think CCAs are not the best way to go about this. These opponents favor addressing the problems of wealth and income inequality and poverty by some other means, such as basic income, stakeholder grants, or means-tested welfare programs. Keywords: Income Inequality; Government Program; Small Restriction; Capital Account; Important Practical Implication (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:etbchp:978-1-137-03165-5_15 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Exploring the Basic Income Guarantee from Palgrave Macmillan |
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