A Hayekian Case for a Basic Income

Theodore Burczak

Chapter Chapter 2 in Basic Income and the Free Market, 2013, pp 49-64 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract In The Constitution of Liberty Hayek’s central concern is to defend a political-economic system that promotes individual freedom by minimizing acts of arbitrary coercion in which some people are forced or manipulated to serve the interests of others. This liberal vision is best fulfilled, Hayek argues, by a market economy where the government has a monopoly on the legitimate exercise of coercion and where its actions are constrained by the rule of law. In the realm of welfare provision, he argues that this framework allows government to provide only a limited safety net. Though “[m]any scholars view The Constitution of Liberty to be F. A. Hayek’s greatest work” (Caldwell, 2011: xi), Hayek’s concept of coercion and its implications for the role of government are, when examined closely, more nuanced and equivocal than Hayek’s classical liberal defenders suppose. This chapter explores one such possibility, a universal BIG as a Hayekian method of reducing labor market coercion.

Keywords: Labor Market; Distributive Justice; Choice Situation; Coercive Power; Efficiency Wage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:etbchp:978-1-137-31593-9_3

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137315939_3

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