Quality of After-Sales Services in a Competitive Insurance Sector†

Alessandro Fedele and Piero Tedeschi ()
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Piero Tedeschi: Department of Economics and Finance, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy.

The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 2015, vol. 40, issue 1, 65-88

Abstract: This paper tackles the issue of unverifiable quality of after-sales insurance services, such as a prompt reimbursement of damages. A dynamic model is introduced in order to allow reputation to emerge as a means of disciplining insurance firms to deliver high quality. The equilibrium of a repeated Bertrand game among the insurers is analysed and conditions are derived under which more concentration in the insurance industry can lead to greater equilibrium consumer welfare.

Date: 2015
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