The Microeconomics of Consent

David Reisman

Chapter 9 in James Buchanan, 2015, pp 123-130 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract No concept figures so prominently in economic theory as does that of voluntary exchange. The ceremony is old and it is familiar. Property rights are well defined. The lesser-valued utility is swapped for the higher-valued satisfaction. Preferences are equal but opposite. No trading partner concludes his contract unless he believes it to be in his interest, self-perceived.

Keywords: Trading Partner; Reservation Price; Pareto Optimality; External Cost; Winning Coalition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:gtechp:978-1-137-42718-2_9

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137427182_9

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