A Rawlsian View of CSR and the Game Theory of its Implementation (Part I): the Multi-stakeholder Model of Corporate Governance

Lorenzo Sacconi

Chapter 7 in Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance, 2011, pp 157-193 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract This is the first part of a comprehensive essay on the Rawlsian view of corporate social responsibility (in short, CSR). CSR is defined as a multi-stakeholder model of corporate governance and objective function based on the extension of fiduciary duties towards all of the firm’s stakeholders (see section 2). A rationale for this idea is given firstly within the perspective of new institutional economic theory in terms of transaction costs efficiency. From this perspective, abuse of authority in regard to the non-controlling stakeholders emerges as the main unsolved problem, and makes it impossible to sever efficiency from equity within the domain of corporate governance (section 3). Intuitively, a Rawlsian principle of redress emerges as the natural answer to the legitimization problem of ownership and control rights allocations when, in order to provide incentives to one party (the incentive to undertake important specific investments), they give it a disproportionate advantage over other non-controlling stakeholders.

Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility; Corporate Governance; Social Contract; Specific Investment; Trust Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: A Rawlsian View of CSR and the Game Theory of its Implementation (Part I): the Multistakeholder Model of Corporate Governance (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:intecp:978-0-230-30211-2_7

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9780230302112

DOI: 10.1057/9780230302112_7

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in International Economic Association Series from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().