Parliamentary Systems

Giovanni Sartori
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Giovanni Sartori: Columbia University

Chapter 6 in Comparative Constitutional Engineering, 1994, pp 101-119 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Parliamentary systems owe their name to their founding principle, namely, that parliament is sovereign. Thus parliamentary systems do not permit a separation of power between parliament and government: they are all based on legislative-executive power sharing.1 Which is also to say that all the systems that we call parliamentary require governments to be appointed, supported and, as the case may be, discharged, by parliamentary vote. But to say that governments are parliament-supported is not saying much. It does not even begin to explain why the polities in question display strong or feeble government, stability or instability, effectiveness or immobilism and, in sum, good, or mediocre, or even detestable performances.

Keywords: Prime Minister; Electoral System; Party System; Stable Government; Coalition Government (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-22861-4_6

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