Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies

Dilip Abreu
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Dilip Abreu: Princeton University

Chapter 5 in Economics in a Changing World, 1996, pp 121-140 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract This chapter surveys some joint work of Hitoshi Matsushima and the author on the topic of the title. It is in no way intended as an overview of the large literature on implementation theory.2 Indeed, discussion of related work is primarily meant to provide a context for our own contribution.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; General Equilibrium; Social Choice; Mixed Strategy; Solution Concept (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-25168-1_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25168-1_5

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