Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information

Sanjay Srivastava
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Sanjay Srivastava: Carnegie-Mellon University

Chapter 6 in Economics in a Changing World, 1996, pp 141-164 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract A mechanism is the procedure through which actions of various individuals result in an outcome. Mechanism design theory studies the relationship between alternative procedures and the outcomes that result. This chapter describes some of the theoretical progress that has been made in the study of mechanism design when there is incomplete information about the preferences of the individuals. It is expository in nature and is not intended to be a survey.1

Keywords: Incomplete Information; Equilibrium Outcome; Allocation Rule; Incentive Compatibility; Full Implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25168-1_6

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