Corporate Governance, Financial Systems and the Transition to Capitalism: Towards a Conceptual Framework

Erik Berglöf
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Erik Berglöf: Université Libre de Bruxelles

Chapter 6 in Property Relations, Incentives and Welfare, 1997, pp 147-170 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract When the Czechoslovak ‘large’ privatization was launched in 1991 it was perceived as one of the most drastic transformations of property rights ever undertaken. A large part of the state-owned industrial assets was distributed in the form of vouchers to all citizens. The wide dispersal of shareholdings was viewed as the foundation for the country’s transition to capitalism and democracy. However, within less than a year of its launch this ideal ‘shareholder democracy’ had turned into one of the most concentrated ownership structures in the capitalist world (Earle, Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1993).

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Financial System; Financial Institution; Mutual Fund; Capital Structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-25287-9_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25287-9_6

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