Incentive Distortions in Developing Agriculture in South Africa and Implications for Tenure Reform

W. Lieb Nieuwoudt, Graham Moor and Rupert Baber
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W. Lieb Nieuwoudt: University of Natal
Graham Moor: University of Natal
Rupert Baber: University of Natal

Chapter 9 in Contemporary Economic Issues, 1998, pp 173-191 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The political transformation in South Africa is a political marvel. One reason why this was accomplished is that potential conflict areas were diffused by pre-emptive steps taken before democratic elections. In terms of land distribution, mechanisms were set in place allowing for land transfers from state and predominantly white-owned commercial farms to small-scale black farmers. These steps are required to alleviate the extreme skewedness of land access, reflected by the fact that the white minority owns about 87 per cent of South Africa’s agricultural land. The new government has proposed various resettlement models to achieve land transfers to previously disenfranchised black farmers, ranging from private ownership to group resettlement (LAPC, 1993).

Keywords: Arable Land; Land Tenure; Grazing Land; Communal Area; Tenure System (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-26188-8_9

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-26188-8_9

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