Rating Agencies, Management Effectiveness and Creditworthiness

Dimitris N. Chorafas

Chapter 2 in Rating Management’s Effectiveness, 2004, pp 28-48 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract In a market economy, financial and industrial companies must have the possibility to go bankrupt. If the supervisory authorities or the prevailing laws and regulations have an eleventh-hour salvage policy, or too much tight rein to avoid bankruptcies, then in the first case it will lead to huge risk-taking, and in the second it will kill entrepreneurial activity. Both policies are, therefore, counterproductive.

Keywords: Rating Agency; Credit Risk; Credit Rating; External Rating; Generally Accept Account Principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-00590-7_2

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230005907_2

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